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When two assets have the same dividend patterns but different levels of transaction costs, it appears the asset with lower bid-ask spread (greater liquidity) is likely to command a higher price. A general analysis of this issue, however, seems to be lacking. A number of authors establish negative price-spread relations (i.e., positive liquidity premia) under special assumptions. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) , who present results in terms of returns rather than prices, in effect prove that the buying (ask) price is a decreasing and convex function of the bid-ask spread. Their assumptions include the following: agents enter the market following a Poisson distribution, the duration of their stay in the market follows an exponential distribution, the asset prices are constant over time, and no investor short sells assets. The empirical studies by Mendelson (1986, 1991) generally confirm their theoretical findings. Kane (1994) further specializes Amihud and Mendelson (1986) in order to find a closed form solution. Using the techniques of Lucas (1978) , Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) establish a return-spread relation for a Markovian steady state equilibrium in which asset prices are constant over time.
Their assumptions (besides the constancy of prices) include: there are only two assets, one asset has no transaction costs, assets can not be sold short, and the dividend of each asset is constant over time. Vayanos (1998) and Vayanos and Vila (1998) study the stationary equilibrium of overlapping generations models in which agents are identical in preferences and endowments and birth and death rates are equal and constant over time.
The special assumptions in these studies make it possible for interesting comparative static-type results to be derived. However, they also make it difficult for us to fathom the robustness of the conclusions. In particular, it remains unclear whether a more liquid asset must always command a higher price under less restrictive assumptions.
In this paper, we analyze the price-spread relation in a general discrete-time, infinite-horizon setting. We model the information structure by a tree, each node of which represents a state of the world. We allow only a finite number of nodes on each date. We also assume that agents have finite lives. Other than these restrictions, our model is very general. We place no restriction on the birth and death patterns of agents. No utility function is used except in examples, and the only restriction on preferences is that they be strictly increasing. The number of assets is arbitrary. The dividends are also arbitrary, except that the assets whose price-spread relations are under investigation are assumed to have identical dividends.
Here is a synopsis of our analysis. We assume there exist two perpetuities, which we call assets A and B, that have identical dividends. Let α(s ) < 1 at every node at which asset B is traded in any equilibrium in which asset B is never sold short (either by choice or due to short-sale constraint) and k has a uniform upper bound. Each of these theorems also has a twin that establishes the convexity of the price-spread relation, for which the existence of a third perpetuity with the same dividends as assets A and B is assumed.
In establishing these theorems, we use a combination of optimality and general equilibrium arguments. To facilitate exposition, we describe a procedure to decompose the asset trades by a finitely lived agent into a finite number of trade pairs. Our arguments resemble the familiar arbitrage arguments in that all they require about preferences is that they be strictly increasing. However, out of a reluctance to specify the assets in the economy in more detail than necessary, our arguments are not based on examining economy-wide opportunities. Instead, we focus on only a handful of assets and make full use of the assumption that they have identical dividends.
Section I does not explain why an equilibrium satisfying the conditions of the theorems therein is natural. Section II uses results in Yu (1998, Essay 2) to partially address this issue. According to Yu (1998) , in any equilibrium in which the aggregate endowment of the economy has a finite present value under some state price process, the fundamental value of any asset with positive supply under this state price process must fall into the interval delineated by its buying and selling prices. We show that this result implies boundedness of k. It also gives rise to an upper bound for the liquidity premium of asset A.
Having described occasions in which there must be a positive liquidity premium, we give two examples of negative liquidity premium in Section III. In the examples, all the conditions of Theorem 2A are satisfied except that the value of k at some node does not prevail at an immediate successor, and all the conditions of Theorem 3A are satisfied except that there exist agents with two-period investment horizons for asset B. We explain through these examples why behavior that leads to negative liquidity premium can be rational. We also use slightly modified versions of these examples to illustrate Theorem 4A and show that, when asset B is never sold short, the liquidity premium can be negative when asset B is not traded. Section IV concludes.
I. Sufficient Conditions for Positive Liquidity Premium
We consider an infinite-horizon economy with sequential trading and model uncertainty by an information tree, a generic node of which on date r is denoted by s . By slicing the initial purchase (sale) of a trade association sufficiently finely, we can further decompose each association into a finite number of trade pairs. Each such pair P is composed of a purchase (sale) at some node s r and an equal sale (purchase) at each of the nodes in a successor set X(P). The set X(P) satisfies two conditions: (1) each node in X(P) is a successor of s r , and (2) each of the terminal nodes for agent h that is a successor of s r is either an element of X(P) or a successor of exactly one node in X(P).
Trade pairs (as well as trade associations) are of two types: buy-and-then-sell, and sell-and-then-buy. There is some arbitrariness on how a trade association is decomposed into trade pairs, but all the pairs from the decomposition of a buy-sell (sell-buy) association are always of the buy-sell (sell-buy) type. Obviously, an agent not endowed with asset B never holds a short (long) position in asset B if and only if all its trade pairs for asset B are of the buy-sell (sell-buy) type. Once the decomposition into trade pairs is complete, we can examine an agent's trades in asset B one trade pair at a time. Forgoing a pair will never cause a violation of the requirement that all assets be liquidated at each of an agent's terminal nodes.
We are ready to present sufficient conditions for k < 1 at every node.
A. Constant Price Ratio
Theorem 1A: In any equilibrium in which q B (s
, where k is some constant, it must be that k < 1.
Proof:
We assert that, with k ≥ 1, no agent born after date 0 (and is therefore not endowed with assets) will have a buy-sell pair for asset B. Suppose instead some such agent h has a trade pair P that represents buying a unit of asset B at s r and selling it at each of the nodes in the successor set X(P). Consider P*, an alternative to P. P* represents buying k units of asset A at s r and selling them at each node in X(P). The cost of P* at s r is kq A (s r ) = q B (s r ), the same as the cost of P. At each node between s r and X(P) and each node in X(P), P* generates more or equal dividend in comparison with P. Let s born after date 0 will never hold a long position in asset B. Consequently, given the positive supply of asset B, the market for asset B can not clear at any node on date L or any later date, where all the agents alive are born after date 0. Therefore, only k < 1 can be consistent with equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Because assets A and B are an arbitrary pair, Theorem 1A, like the theorems we will develop later, actually establishes a general decreasing relation between the buying price and the bid-ask spread. Trivially, q A > q B implies (1 -α)q A > (1 -β)q B , or there is also a decreasing relation between the selling price and the bid-ask spread. Note that, like Theorems 1B, 2 and 3 below, Theorem 1A is valid regardless of whether short selling asset A or B is allowed.
We now turn to the curvature of the price-spread relation. Suppose there is another perpetuity C that pays identical dividends as assets A and B. Asset C has positive supply at every node. Its bid-ask spread γ(s buying price q C is strictly positive. At each node, define q and q* as:
Trivially, q > q B indicates a convex relation between the buying price and the bid-ask spread, and q* > (1 -β)q B indicates a convex relation between the selling price and the bid-ask spread.
Theorem 1B: Suppose α, β and γ are constants. Then q > q B and q* > (1 -β)q B at any node in any equilibrium with constant price ratios for assets A, B and C.
Proof: According to Theorem 1A, q A > q B > q C at any node. Define m by q B = mq. Given the constant price ratios and the constancy of α, β and γ, m is a constant. We assert that, with m ≥ 1, no agent born after date 0 will have a buy-sell pair for asset B.
Suppose instead some such agent h has a trade pair P that represents buying a unit of asset B at s r and selling it at each of the nodes in a successor set X(P). Consider P**, an alternative to P. P** represents buying m γ β γ α − − unit of asset A and m β α γ α − − unit of asset C at s r and selling them at each node in X(P). The cost of P** at s r is m γ β γ α
, the same as the cost of P. The total units in P** is
At each node between s r and X(P) and each node in X(P), P** generates more or equal dividend in comparison with P. Let s t be a generic node in X(P). The selling proceeds of P at s t is (1 -β)q B (s t ). The selling proceeds of P** at s t is
Therefore, with m ≥ 1, agent h can do strictly better by substituting P** for P, and so P or any other buy-sell pair is inconsistent with equilibrium, and agent h or any other agent born after date 0 will never hold a long position in asset B. Consequently, given the positive supply of asset B, only m < 1 or q > q B at every node can be consistent with equilibrium. Furthermore, from (1) 
Q.E.D.
By establishing the negativity and convexity of the price-spread relation with arbitrary preferences, endowments and asset specifications, Theorem 1 shows that the same kind of relation in Amihud and Mendelson (1986) is the direct consequence of their constant price assumption and not the result of other special features.
B. Constant Price Ratio on Branches
Though more general than the assumption of constant prices, the assumption of constant price ratio is also quite special. We now relax this assumption somewhat and assume instead that the price ratio k has a uniform upper bound and that the value of k at any node will continue to prevail at at least one immediate successor node.
Theorem 2A: Suppose the bid-ask spreads satisfy the uniform bound and s R and selling it at each node in a successor set X(P). Noting that k(s τ ) = k(s r ) by construction, it is also easy to show that, if
at each s t ∈X(P), agent h could do strictly better by replacing P by P*, which represents buying k(s r ) units of asset A at s τ and selling them at each node in X(P). (Note that, given the variable price ratio, this replacement may lower the portfolio liquidation value of agent h at some nodes in X(P) or between s τ and X(P). It is for this reason that we allow unlimited borrowing at all non-terminal nodes.) Therefore, there must be some s t ∈X(P) at
Using (4) in (6a), we get: 
But (6c) contradicts the premise that K is the uniform upper bound of k. Therefore, in any equilibrium satisfying the conditions of the theorem, it must be that k < 1 or q A > q B at all nodes. Q.E.D.
Theorem 2A relies on two critical assumptions. The first is the existence of a uniform upper bound for k. In section 4, we will use results in Yu (1998) to explain why the existence of such a bound is quite natural. The second critical assumption is that the value of k at any node continues to prevail at at least one immediate successor. We have no similar defense for this assumption. We do observe, however, that the assumption is satisfied by any Markovian equilibrium in which k can take on only a finite number of values and the diagonal elements of the transition matrix for k are always all positive. (k can take on only a finite number of values if asset prices are quoted in discrete increments, which is usually the case in the real world, and are bounded.)
The theorem below is in parallel with Theorem 1B. The assumption that the ratio between q C and q A is uniformly bounded away from 1 plays a role similar to the bounding condition (4). The asset bundle composed of γ β γ α − − unit of asset A and β α γ α − − unit of asset C is more liquid than asset B. However, the equivalent spread of the asset bundle may not be bounded away from β unless the ratio between q C and q A is uniformly bounded away from 1. 
Proof of Theorem
If (7) were not true for any s t ∈X(P), P would be strictly dominated by P* selling them at each node in X(P). By the assumption that the ratio between q C and q A is uniformly bounded away from 1, there exists some constant δ > 0 such that q A /q c ≥ 1 + δ at any node. Noting that q B (s t ) = m(s t )q(s t ), from (7) and the definition of q in (1) we get: Proof: Suppose k ≥ 1 at some node s r where asset B is traded. Because asset B is never sold short, the buyer of asset B must have a trade pair P that represents buying a unit of asset B at s r and selling it at a successor set X(P). By arguments similar to those in the proof of Theorem 2A, k must increase by a factor of at least ρ > 1 between s r and some s t in X(P). But s t is another node at which asset B is traded, and so repeating the above arguments leads to the unboundedness of k. Q.E.D.
Theorem 4A is valid in any equilibrium in which asset B is never sold short, regardless whether the absence of short sale is by choice or the result of short-sale constraint. The theorem below is in parallel with Theorems 1B, 2B and 3B. Its proof is obvious and omitted. 
II. Bounds on the Size of the Liquidity Premium
In this section, we use results in Yu (1998, Essay 2) to explain why the uniform upper bound for k in Theorems 2, 3 and 4 is quite natural and to establish a simple bound for the liquidity premium. Following Santos and Woodford (1997) , Yu (1998) 
Combining (9a) and (9b), we get:
The second part of (10) 
III. Examples of Negative Liquidity Premium
Like the negatively sloped demand curve, positive liquidity premium is the norm.
At the same time, as our examples will show, just as Giffen goods are a theoretical possibility in the price theory, so is negative liquidity premium in a finance theory based on optimization and market clearing. In each example, the economy has two perpetuities with constant percentage bid-ask spreads α and β satisfying 0 < α < β < 1. These are the only assets, and they can be sold short. Each asset has a constant supply of 1 and pays a constant dividend d > 0 on each node. There is a single numeraire good at each node.
Utility functions are twice differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
A. Example 1: Deterministic Periodicity
Consider a deterministic economy with dates t = 0, 1, …. One each even date, an even agent is born. It lives on three dates, and its utility function is:
On each odd date, an odd three-date agent is born, with utility function U*(c*) = U* 1 (c* 1 ) + U* 2 (c* 2 ) + U* 3 (c* 3 )
The good endowments are ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 and ω* 1 , ω* 2 , ω* 3 . In addition, there are two extra agents alive at t = 0. One is endowed with one unit of asset A and two units of asset B and lives only at t = 0. The other is endowed with -1 unit of asset B and lives on dates t = 0 and t = 1, with utility function and good endowments exactly like that of an odd agent on its last two dates. The buying prices of the assets are q A and q B on even dates and q A * and q B * on odd dates. We assume q A > q B and q A * < q B *, or that the liquidity premium is positive on even dates and negative on odd dates.
We consider the following trading pattern. An even agent buys one unit of asset A and two units of asset B on its first date and sells them on its third (last) date. It does not trade assets on its second date. An odd agent does not trade in asset A. It does not trade asset B on its second date. On its first date, it sells one unit of asset B short. On its third date, it buys one unit of asset B to cover up its short position. Obviously, this trading pattern implies market clearing. It also implies that even (odd) agents trade only with even (odd) agents. We use u i to denote U i 's first derivative. The trading pattern is optimal if and only if the following conditions are satisfied. (12a) and (12g)) (12d) (12a) and (12c)) (12h) (12b) and (12e)) (12j) (13c) and (13g)
(12a) and (12b) ensure that buying more or less than one unit of asset A or two units of asset B on the first date and selling it on the third date will not raise an even agent's total utility. (12c) and (12d) ensure that buying or selling asset A on the first date and liquidating it on the second date will not raise an even agent's total utility. (12e) and (12f) are the asset B counterparts of (12c) and (12d). (12g) and (12h) ensure that buying or selling asset A on the second date and liquidating it on the third date will not raise an even agent's total utility. (12i) and (12j) are the asset B counterparts of (12g) and (12h).
(13) contains parallel conditions for an odd agent.
By adjusting utility functions and good endowments, we can make the u's attain
any positive values that we want. Therefore, to construct a desired equilibrium, all we need to do is to find a set of strictly positive values for α, β, d, the u's and the q's with α < β < 1, q A > q B and q A * < q B * that satisfy conditions (12a) through (12i) and (13a) through ( The behavior of all the agents in this example is perfectly rational. An even agent purchases assets on its first date to enhance its consumption later in life, and asset prices are such that an even agent finds buying assets A and B equally attractive at the margin.
On its second date, an even agent has the option of selling the assets. Because the prices of either asset is not very high on the second date and the third date marginal utility is substantial, an even agent finds it preferable to hold on to both assets and sell them on the third date. The behavior of an odd agent can be explained along similar lines.
B. Example 2: Stochastic Single Occurrence
The periodicity in example 1 is not needed for the existence of a negative liquidity premium. In this subsection, we construct a stochastic example in which negative liquidity premium occurs at a single node. Consider an economy that branches only on t = 2. For each date t ≥ 2, there are two nodes: λ t and µ t .
There are three types of typical agents. Each typical agent lives over two nodes on two dates, has no asset endowment, purchases a unit of each asset on its first date and sells off assets on its second (last) date. Agents within each type have the same timeseparable utility function and good endowments. On t = 0, a type 1 agent is born. On each λ node, a type λ agent is born. On each µ node from t = 3 onward, a type µ agent is born.
Let q A and q B be the constant asset buying prices at t = 0 and t = 1. It is easy to verify that the type 1 agent's asset transactions are optimal under some utility function and good endowments if Only the type 1 agent lives between t = 0 and t = 1, only λ agents live at the λ nodes from t = 3 on, and only µ agents live at µ nodes from t = 4 on. An extra agent is born and lives only on t = 0 and is endowed with one unit of each asset. With the three sets of constant prices satisfying (14), the liquidity premium is positive at every node other than µ 2 , and, with the utility functions and good endowments that guarantee the optimality of all the typical agents, asset demands and asset supplies are equated on t = 0, λ 3 and any node from date t = 4 onward. In addition, the type 1 agent wants to sell one unit of each asset on t = 1, and the typical agents born on λ 2 and µ 3 want to buy one unit of each asset on their birth nodes.
Three agents (x, y and z) are born on t = 1. Agent x lives on four nodes: t = 1, λ 2 , µ 2 and µ 3 . Agents y and z live on three nodes: t = 1, λ 2 and µ 2 . There is no birth on µ 2 .
Suppose agent x buys one unit of each asset on t = 1 and sells off assets on λ 2 and µ 3 , agent y buys one unit of asset B on t = 1 and sells it off on t = 2 nodes, agent z sells one unit of asset B on t = 1 and buys it back on t = 2 nodes, and agents y and z do not trade in asset A. Clearly, this trading pattern implies market clearing. Let q A * and q B * be the asset prices at µ 2 . Our task is to show that the trading pattern is consistent with optimization by agents x, y and z under a set of positive values for α, β, d, the marginal utilities and the asset prices with q A * < q B *. Agent x's behavior is optimal if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
The expressions for consumption are not essential and are omitted here. (15a) and (15b) ensure that buying more or less than one unit of either asset at t = 1 and selling it at λ 2 and µ 3 will not raise total utility. (15c) and (15d) ensure that buying or selling asset A at t = 1 and liquidating it at λ 2 and µ 2 will not raise total utility. (15e) and (15f) are the asset B counterparts of (15c) and (15d). (15g) and (15h) ensure that buying or selling asset A at µ 2 and liquidating it at µ 3 will not raise total utility. (15i) and (15j) are the asset B counterparts of (15g) and (15h).
The optimization conditions for agents y and z are: Agent x buys assets at t = 1 to enhance later consumption. Its marginal utility at µ 2 is low, so it chooses not the sell assets at µ 2 . Agent y buys asset B at t = 1 to enhance later consumption. It finds asset A not as attractive to buy as asset B, because it has high marginal utility at µ 2 , where asset B can be sold at a higher price. Agent z short sells asset B at t = 1 to enhance its consumption there. It finds asset A not as attractive to sell as asset B, because it has low marginal utility at µ 2 , where covering asset B's short position is more costly.
C. Modifying the Examples to Illustrate Absence of Short Sales
If we take out all the odd agents in example 1 while keeping the asset prices and the preferences and endowments of the even agents intact, the kind of even agent behavior described in that example continues to be both optimal and market clearing.
What we end up with is a new equilibrium in which the liquidity premium is negative on all the odd dates. This does not contradict Theorem 4A, because asset B is not traded on odd dates in our new equilibrium. Similarly, if we take out agents y and z in example 2, we end up with a new equilibrium in which no agent ever short sells asset B and the liquidity premium is positive at every node other than µ 2 , where asset B is not traded.
IV. Conclusion
This paper serves several purposes. By establishing four sets of sufficient conditions, it shows that a positive liquidity premium and a convex price-spread relation must occur in a variety of equilibrium settings. In particular, the positive liquidity premium and the convex price-spread relation in Amihud and Mendelson (1986) is the direct consequence of the constant price assumption and not the result of other special features. The proofs of the sufficiency theorems demonstrate the fruitfulness of general equilibrium arguments. The paper's discussions of the implications of finite present value of aggregate endowments establish a linkage between the liquidity premium and the theory of asset price bubbles found in Yu (1998) . Finally, through examples, the paper shows how a negative liquidity premium can be consistent with optimization and market clearing.
